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CASE COMMENT 
 
Lorna Richardson* 
The Limits of Statutory Personal Bar: Leases and the Requirements of Writing 
(Scotland) Act 1995 
 
Gyle Shopping Centre General Partners Ltd v Marks and Spencer plc1 
provides further clarity on when s1(3) and (4) of the Requirements of Writing 
(Scotland) Act 1995 can be used in relation to leases; the status of the 
common law rules of rei interventus and homologation; and the effect of 
landlords failing to take action in relation to past breaches of the lease. 
A THE FACTS 
The pursuer was the owner and landlord of the Gyle Shopping Centre, 
Edinburgh. The defender was one of two anchor tenants of the Centre. The 
landlord had entered into an agreement for lease with a third party, Primark, 
which involved the construction of a new building that would be partially 
constructed on the existing car parking areas. The lease between the pursuer 
and the defender granted to the defender inter alia a one third pro indiviso 
share of and in the car park. The lease also stipulated that the car park would 
only be used for parking for customers and staff of the Centre except to the 
extent that the Represented Parties otherwise agreed in writing. The landlord, 
the defender and the other anchor tenant, Morrisons, were collectively the 
Represented Parties. The lease provided that it could not be varied except in 
accordance with the provisions of the lease or by agreement (recorded in the 
Register of Sasines, Land Register or other successor Register) among the 
Represented Parties.   
The lease made provision for a management committee, made up of 
representatives appointed by the Represented Parties. Evidence was led that, 
at a number of committee meetings, reference had been made to the Primark 
development, including the fact that it required an enlarged unit which would 
use up some car parking spaces. The minutes of the meetings noted that 
plans had been provided showing the extent of the reconfiguration of the 
Centre, together with the fact that planning approval had been obtained for 
the development. No objection was raised to the development at any of the 
meetings and, indeed, the defender’s and Morrisons’ representatives had 
endorsed the development. The minutes had been signed by an employee of 
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1 [2014] CSOH 122; 2015 S.C.L.R. 171; 2014 G.W.D. 26-527 
the defender “for and on behalf of” the defender. The minutes stated “I confirm 
I have read the minutes of the above date and that they are an accurate 
reflection of the meeting. The proposals made therein are hereby approved”.  
To progress the Primark development the pursuer had sought and obtained 
planning permission and relocated a number of tenants within the Centre at 
an estimated cost of £1 million. The pursuer wrote to the defender noting that 
approval for the development had been obtained via the management 
committee meetings and enclosed a deed of variation for signing. The 
defender, in response, drew attention to the formalities specified in the lease 
for alteration of the shared areas and noted that the defender did not agree to 
the proposed alterations to the car park. The pursuer contended that it had 
entered into a contract with the defender or that the defender had undertaken 
a unilateral obligation for the variation and partial extinction of the defender’s 
real rights so as to permit the development. The agreement or obligation was 
said to have been entered into verbally by the defender’s representatives at 
committee meetings and by the signing of minutes of those meetings. The 
pursuer averred that it had acted in reliance on the contract or unilateral 
obligation, with the defender’s knowledge and acquiescence, and that as a 
result the lease had been varied.2 
The pursuer sought declarator that in the event it commenced construction of 
the development the defender would be personally barred from taking any 
action to prevent the pursuer from doing so. Three issues were set out for 
determination. The first was whether the pursuer could rely on s 1(3) and (4) 
of the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995. 
B STATUTORY PERSONAL BAR  
The focus of discussion was whether s1(3) applied to a lease. Section 1(3) 
applies to a contract or obligation mentioned in s1(2)(a) – that is a contract or 
unilateral obligation for the creation, transfer, variation or extinction of a real 
right in land - but not the creation or variation of a real right in land for which a 
written document is required by s1(2)(b).3 The pursuer argued that s1(3) 
applied because a lease can be a contract as well as the grant of a real right 
in land. As such it was argued that the lease could fall within both s1(2)(a)(i) 
and s1(2)(b). Lord Tyre noted that in The Advice Centre for Mortgages v 
McNicoll4 Lord Drummond Young had observed that the legislative intention 
was clearly to separate contracts relating to land, on the one hand, from 
dispositions and other deeds that actually effect the creation or transfer of an 
                                                             
2 The pursuer’s position as set out at para [3] suggests that the pursuer’s claim is based on 
there being a contract or unilateral obligation to vary the lease. The report later makes clear 
that the pursuer had based its case on the lease having been varied – para [17]. The 
pursuer’s propositions in law are set out in para [13] which help clarify the pursuer’s position.  
3 See the discussion at para [14] 
4 2006 SLT 591 
interest in land on the other. Lord Drummond Young had held that the 
personal bar provisions in s1 should be confined to transactions that create 
rights which are purely personal and that s1(3) and (4) were not intended to 
apply to a transaction creating rights that could be made real by registration or 
taking possession. This fundamental distinction had to be given effect to in 
relation to leases. Where it could be inferred that the intention of the parties 
was that real rights would be created in favour of the tenant, the document 
would fall within s1(2)(b) and s1(3) would not apply. Lord Tyre agreed with 
Lord Drummond Young’s analysis5, noting,  
 
“I agree in particular that the 1995 Act draws a fundamental distinction 
between the creation of personal rights, where a party’s actings may 
bar him from founding upon a failure to constitute the contract in a 
written document complying with section 2, and the creation of real 
rights, good against third parties, as regards whom a party’s actings 
can have no such effect.”6 
In Lord Tyre’s view Lord Drummond Young had identified sound policy 
reasons for drawing this distinction7. The distinction also respected the 
personal character of the doctrine of personal bar.8 Section 1(6) made clear 
that the same rules applied to the transfer, variation and extinction of rights as 
applied to the creation of rights. As such s1(3) had no application to the 
variation of a real right in land. That was so whether the real right was a right 
in the principal subjects leased or a real right granted as a pertinent to the 
principal subjects.9 Lord Tyre concluded that statutory personal bar would be 
capable of applying to an agreement to vary the terms of the lease, but not to 
a variation of the lease itself.10 The pursuer had based its case solely on the 
latter having occurred. As such it was necessary for Lord Tyre to consider the 
pursuer’s alternative argument based on rei interventus.  
C REI INTERVENTUS 
The pursuer contended that because the common law rules of rei interventus 
and homologation were not expressly displaced by the 1995 Act, other than in 
relation to contracts and obligations mentioned in s1(2)(a), they remained in 
force for the constitution of rights under s1(2)(b)11. The pursuer’s argument 
                                                             
5 Paras [14] and [16] 
6 Para [16] 
7 See McNicoll at paras [16] – [18] 
8 Para [16], referring to the explanation of the issue by Lord President Rodger in William 
Grant & Sons Ltd v Glen Catrine Bonded Warehouse Ltd 2001 SC 901  
9 The pursuer had sought to distinguish The Advice Centre for Mortgages v McNicoll on the 
basis that the lease in that case related to the creation of a lease whereas the current case 
concerned a real right in pertinents that were ancillary to the lease. 
10 Para [17] 
11 The pursuer relied on Professor Rennie’s opinion to this effect in “Requirements of Writing: 
Problems in Practice” [1996] SLPQ 187 
was that if it could prove rei interventus and homologation,12 it would cure the 
defects of form in the variation. 
Lord Tyre was not persuaded by this argument. His Lordship noted that there 
was nothing in the Scottish Law Commissions’ report13 preceding the 1995 
Act to suggest that the Commission envisaged that the common law rules 
would operate in parallel with the new statutory personal bar. In Lord Tyre’s 
opinion the terms of the 1995 Act reflected the Commission’s conclusion that 
the common law in this area should be replaced by the new statutory rules. 
The plain meaning of s1(5) was that the pre-1995 law of rei interventus and 
homologation was replaced in its entirety by the new statutory personal bar.14 
D WAIVER 
Lord Tyre considered it important to identify the correct starting point by 
determining what right it was said the defender was debarred from exercising. 
In Lord Tyre’s view the correct question was whether the defender’s right to 
prevent construction and leasing of the Primark development had been 
waived. 
Evidence was led that in 2009 the layout of the site on which the Centre was 
built was permanently altered when a restaurant was constructed. Part of the 
land on which the restaurant was built formed part of the shared areas. This 
development had been discussed and agreed to at management committee 
meetings. The defender had not suggested that a more formal mechanism 
was required. In 2011 part of the car park was temporarily removed when the 
defender’s premises were being reconfigured. This had also been discussed 
and approved of at management committee meetings. The Primark 
development had, in the same manner, been discussed and approved of at 
management committee meetings. 
Lord Tyre was of the view that that evidence fell far short of establishing that 
there had been a voluntary, informed and unequivocal waiver by the defender 
of its right to prevent construction and leasing of the Primark development.15 
The pursuer had erred in treating the defender’s representatives (who 
attended the committee meetings and approved the minutes) as equivalent to 
the defender itself and had wrongly characterised the conduct of those 
individuals as the conduct of the defender. Those individuals were not 
empowered in terms of the defender’s lease to take decisions affecting the 
                                                             
12 As set out by Lord Kyllachy in Carron Company v Henderson’s Trs (1896) 23R 1042 at 
1049. 
13 Report on Requirements of Writing (Scot Law Com No 112, 1988 
14 Para [20], agreeing with Lord Drummond Young in The Advice Centre for Mortgages v 
McNicoll who had referred to Professor Reid’s annotations to the Current Law Statutes print 
of the 1995 Act. 
15 Para [32] 
defender’s real rights in the shared areas.16 The fact that the restaurant had 
been built following approval at committee meetings was analogous on its 
facts to Carron Company v Henderson’s Trustees17 in which coal workings 
were carried out, with the landlord’s knowledge and tacit consent, in breach of 
the lease. The court held that although on the authority of Bargeddie Coal Co 
v Wark18 the landlord would have been barred by acquiescence from seeking 
any remedy for the past breach of the lease, this did not amount to an 
agreement to vary the lease. As such the landlord was not barred from 
demanding observance of the lease in the future. In this case there no doubt 
had come a time when the defender became barred by acquiescence from 
objecting to the interference with its real rights by the construction of the 
restaurant, but that did not bar the defender from insisting on compliance with 
the lease as regards the Primark development.19 The same considerations 
applied to the temporary use of car parking spaces during the defender’s 
works.20  
E CONCLUSIONS 
This decision follows the earlier Outer House decision of The Advice Centre 
for Mortgages v McNicoll in holding that s1(3) of the Requirements of Writing 
(Scotland) Act 1995 does not apply to leases where the parties intend to 
create real rights, this being the domain of s1(2)(b) of the Act rather than 
s1(2)(a)(i). Lord Tyre’s decision makes clear that this is the position 
regardless of whether the real right under consideration relates to the principal 
subjects of the lease or a pertinent granted along with the principal subjects. 
Lord Drummond Young’s decision in The Advice Centre for Mortgages is not 
without its critics,21 but this decision reinforces the fact that deficiencies of 
formality in relation to leases cannot be cured by the statutory personal bar 
provisions found in s1(3) and (4) of the 1995 Act where the parties intend that 
a real right be created.  
The case also makes clear that the statutory personal bar provisions in s 1(3) 
and (4) of the Act entirely replace the pre-1995 law of rei interventus and 
homologation. Section 1(5) specifically mentions s1(2)(a) but this decision, 
again following McNicoll, makes plain that the old rules are no longer relevant. 
The requirement for a written document complying with s 2 is unqualified with 
regard to the creation, transfer, variation or extinction of a real right in land 
                                                             
16 Para [32]. The powers of the management committee were considered in more detail in an 
earlier hearing of this case reported at [2014] CSOH 59. 
17 (1896) 23 R 1042 
18 (1859) 3 Macq 467 
19 Para [34]. There appears to have been a non waiver clause in the lease – the report refers 
to clause 104 of the lease but does not set out its terms. 
20 Para [35] 
21 See A McAllister, The Scottish Law of Leases, (4th ed, 2013, Bloomsbury Professional), 
para 2.11 and 2.19-2.20 and A McAllister, “Leases and the Requirements of Writing”, 2006 
SLT (News) 254 
(s1(2)(b)). The requirement for writing is qualified only in relation to contracts 
for the creation, transfer, variation or extinction of real rights in land 
(s1(2)(a)(i)) as such only s1(2)(a) is mentioned in s 1(5).  
It does appear from the report of the case that there had not been a voluntary, 
informed and unequivocal waiver of rights by the defender. Indeed, it seemed 
that the individuals who attended the management committee meetings did 
not turn their minds to the terms of the defender’s lease or were even aware 
of what those rights were.22 The case emphasises that past breaches of a 
lease by a tenant which have been overlooked or acquiesced in by the 
landlord do not prevent the landlord from seeking future compliance with the 
lease. Failing to object to a past breach is not tantamount to agreement to 
vary the lease to permit such behaviour in future.23  
 
  
 
                                                             
22 Para [32] 
23 There has been a further hearing in this case where the landlords have successfully 
obtained declarator that the defenders are unreasonably withholding consent to the Primark 
development in terms of the lease. This case is reported as [2015] CSOH 14. 
